OUR DEMOCRACY IS TOO FRAGILE TO WARRANT A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

By Macphersson Mutale 

Zambia often speaks the language of development with the confidence of a nation that believes it is on the right democratic path.

Vision 2030, the Eighth National Development Plan, and repeated pledges to build a “developmental state” all point to an ambition to combine democracy with rapid socio-economic transformation.

Yet this ambition rests on a fragile foundation.

The uncomfortable truth is that Zambia’s democracy, while procedurally intact, remains too weak, inconsistent, and politicized to sustain a genuine developmental state.

A developmental state is not merely a government that spends on infrastructure or announces industrial policies.

It is a system anchored in strong institutions, policy continuity, meritocratic public service, disciplined political leadership, and a social contract that subordinates narrow political interests to long-term national goals.

Countries often cited as models—such as South Korea, Taiwan, or more recently Rwanda and Ethiopia in selective respects—built development on the back of cohesive states with high bureaucratic capacity and political discipline.

Zambia, by contrast, operates a democracy that is highly competitive but poorly institutionalized, emotionally charged, and deeply personalized.

At the heart of Zambia’s democratic fragility is the over-concentration of power in the executive.

While elections are regularly held and power has changed hands peacefully, real accountability between elections remains weak.

Parliament is largely subordinated to party loyalties, oversight institutions are underfunded or politically pressured, and independent voices—whether in civil society, the church, or professional bodies—often retreat into silence when power changes hands.

Democracy becomes episodic, activated during elections and muted thereafter.

This is not the kind of democracy that can discipline a state into developmental behavior.

Furthermore, Zambia’s democracy has failed to entrench a culture of policy continuity.

Each change of government is accompanied by abrupt policy reversals, dismantling of previous programs, and a purge—real or perceived—of institutions.

Developmental states thrive on long planning horizons; Zambia governs in short political cycles. Industrial strategies, mining policies, energy reforms, and public investment priorities are routinely recalibrated to fit immediate political narratives rather than long-term national interest. Investors, local entrepreneurs, and technocrats operate in an atmosphere of uncertainty, which undermines growth and innovation.

The politicization of institutions further exposes the weakness of Zambia’s democratic framework. Key state agencies—law enforcement, regulatory bodies, public media, and even parts of the judiciary—are often viewed through partisan lenses.

Whether these perceptions are always accurate is beside the point; the damage lies in the erosion of public trust.

A developmental state requires institutions that are feared for their competence and respected for their neutrality.

Zambia’s institutions are instead frequently suspected of selective enforcement, delayed justice, or political convenience. Development cannot thrive where rules are seen as flexible for the powerful and rigid for the powerless.

Equally troubling is the character of political competition itself. Zambian politics is largely organized around personalities, ethnic calculations, and short-term populism rather than coherent ideological or economic programs.

Elections are won on promises of relief rather than production, subsidies rather than structural reform.

Once in office, governments inherit fiscal stress, debt obligations, and social pressure, leaving little room for bold, disciplined developmental choices. In such an environment, democracy becomes a constraint on development not because democracy is inherently flawed, but because it is shallow and transactional.

The social foundations of democracy are also weak. High poverty levels, unemployment—especially among the youth—and economic insecurity reduce citizenship to survival.

When voters are trapped in poverty, democracy risks becoming a bargaining process for immediate material relief rather than a mechanism for holding leaders accountable to long-term development outcomes.

This undermines the very civic discipline that a developmental state demands. Citizens cannot effectively demand performance from the state when they are perpetually dependent on it.

None of this is an argument against democracy. On the contrary, it is an argument for a deeper, more mature democracy. Zambia does not suffer from too much democracy; it suffers from an incomplete one.

A developmental state cannot be built on fragile institutions, polarized politics, and a culture of impunity.

Without strong checks and balances, professional public service, and a shared national vision insulated from electoral cycles, the rhetoric of development remains hollow.

If Zambia is serious about development, it must first stabilize and strengthen its democracy.

This means institutional reforms that genuinely limit executive overreach, protect independent oversight bodies, and professionalize the civil service beyond party affiliation. It means transforming elections from emotional contests into policy competitions.

It means cultivating civic consciousness that values productivity, accountability, and national interest over political loyalty.

Until then, Zambia’s aspiration to become a developmental state will remain premature. A fragile democracy cannot carry the weight of development.

Without democratic maturity, development becomes accidental, reversible, and uneven.

The challenge before Zambia is not to abandon democracy in pursuit of development, but to fix its democracy so that development becomes possible, sustainable, and inclusive. – Tuesday, 6th January, 2026

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